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BOOK REVIEW

CORPORATE ETHICS AND LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL

ENTERPRISES: PRINCIPLES AND LIMITS.

(Reviewing G. ELFSTROM,*

MORAL ISSUES AND MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS

(1991))

Reviewed by Richard Gruner**
Large corporations are important, yet enigmatic, participants in world
commerce. International corporate behavior is morally and legally significant because of its immense scope and societal impact. That behavior,
however, is often so complex as to defy characterization under the simple
moral or legal standards applicable to individuals. Furthermore, the ability of traditional moral or legal systems to shape multinational corporate
conduct is also unclear given that large corporate bureaucracies lack the
motivations and fears normally used to enforce moral or legal accountability. As one frustrated court noted, the problem is that corporations
have "no soul to damn, and no body to be kicked.""

In Moral Issues and Multinational Corporations,2 Professor Gerald

Elfstrom examines corporate morality as a constraint upon multinational
corporate behavior. He addresses two fundamental corporate control and
accountability questions: First, when should corporations, as opposed to
*
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into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 386 (1981).
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the individual employees and agents who operate them, be morally accountable? Second, how do moral standards for corporate conduct vary,
if at all, when large firms intersect multiple cultures and value systems
through international operations?
Although Elfstrom examines these topics from a philosopher's viewpoint, legal analysts also can benefit from his study. The moral standards
he articulates can be used for evaluating corporate liability standards
governing overseas conduct. United States law already imposes criminal
and civil liability on corporations when their overseas conduct does not
meet domestic moral standards. For example, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) imposes liability on United States firms for payments
to foreign officials that, although not violative of the laws of the nations
in which the payments are made, offend United States notions about
proper methods of influencing government decisions.'
Studies like Professor Elfstrom's book that delineate corporate morality principles in international settings should help the legal community
determine whether statutes like the FCPA have expanded criminal liability beyond its moral underpinnings. Of course, illegal conduct need
not-and .often does not-precisely match immoral conduct. Widely-held
moral principles, however, certainly shape standards for identifying
criminal behavior." An analysis explaining why particular corporate conduct is immoral can: 1) indicate that such conduct should be criminalized
because laws generally should match moral standards;5 2) help identify
the harmful or unfair quality of the behavior, which may justify
criminalization on utilitarian or other policy grounds; 6 or 3) provide a
rallying point for public opinion in favor of criminalizing the behavior
through political action.7 Under any of these approaches, new insights
into the morality of multinational corporate action can provide useful
grounding for adjusting the criminalization of corporate behavior.

3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 79dd-l,'78dd-2 (1982).
4. See, e.g., 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 39-42 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
5. See generally LoN FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964).
6. The need to separate law from morality and to justify legal rules in terms of
policies like utilitarianism is a basic tenant of legal positivism. See generally H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
7. Advocates of legal pragmatism contend that laws are settled primarily by political
or judicial consensus. Under this approach, initial articulations of laws act like hypotheses, which are subject to continuing scrutiny by courts and politically motivated legislators until they become more or less clarified and settled by consensus. See generally FREDERIC ROGERS KELLOGG, THE FORMATIVE ESSAYS OF JUSTICE HOLMES: THE
MAKING OF AN AMERICAN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 280 (1984).
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MEASURING CORPORATE ORGANIZATIONAL MORALITY
APART FROM THE AGGREGATE MORALITY OF

CORPORATE EMPLOYEES

Modern analysts have an unfortunate tendency to treat large corporations like overgrown persons. For example, in most legal contexts, corporations are treated like persons;8 indeed, they often are referred to as
persons.9 This legal fiction is simply a shorthand way of saying that no
significant policy reason exists to treat corporate and individual actors
differently, and legal standards developed for individuals consequently
should be applied equally to corporations.
Unfortunately, in many instances in which corporations and individuals are treated equally under the law, it is not because a careful policy
analysis has indicated so. Rather, lawmakers or courts have simply assumed that corporations and individuals should be treated similarly in
all cases in which a contrary result is not indicated clearly.1 ° Alternatively, some courts and lawmakers have justified similar treatment of corporations and individuals based on rough physical analogies of corporate
actions and decision making to individual counterparts, even though the
legal standards involved did not relate to the similar features recognized
in the comparative studies."' In short, past analyses of corporate criminal
8. See, e.g., The Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700 (1878); New York Cent. & H.
R.R. Co. v. United States 212 U.S. 481, 494-95 (1909). See generally CHRISTOPHER
STONE, WHERE THE LAw ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR

24-25 (1975).
9. For example, the California Penal Code defines a "person" to include a corporation as well as a natural person. See Cal. Pen. Code § 7 (West 1990). California courts

long have recognized corporations as proper criminal defendants for many years. As
early as 1907, a California court held that "[p]rivate corporations in respect of their
liability for the acts of their agents or servants stand before the law on the same footing
as individuals." People v. Palermo Land & Water Co., 4 Cal. App. 717, 721, 89 P. 723,
725 (1907). The position adopted in some other states that fictitious persons, like corporations, cannot commit certain crimes has been firmly rejected by California courts. See
CRIMINAL LAW § 100, 17 Cal. Jur. 3d 146. In California, "corporations [are] proper
defendants in any criminal case." Granite Construction Co. v. Superior Court of Fresno,
149 Cal. App. 3d 465, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3, 4 (1983).
10. This assumption is embedded typically in state laws through definitional provisions that identify corporations as a type of person, thereby making all legal standards
governing persons equally binding on corporations. See, e.g., Cal. Pen. Code § 7 (West
1990).
11. The irony of this approach is that large corporations have achieved their economic success precisely because of their dissimilarity to individual actors. See, e.g., JOHN
KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 74-75 (2d ed. 1971) ("[Mlodern

economic society can only be understood as an effort, wholly successful, to synthesize by
organization a group personality far superior for its purpose to a natural person.").
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liability have involved a variety of unexplored-and sometimes amusing-conclusions about corporate life,1 2 but relatively rare assessments of

the grounds for treating corporations like individuals and the principles
for limiting that equation.
Assessments of corporate morality potentially suffer from a similar
problem. Because most moral standards and analyses are framed in individual terms, a temptation exists simply to recast those analyses to a
corporate level when determining corporate morality. At least when
dealing with large corporate organizations, corporate morality assessments are not so simple.' 3
Fortunately, Professor Elfstrom is sensitive to this potential weakness.
In Moral Issues and Multinational Corporations,he attempts to identify the corporate features that justify treating a corporate organization
as a morally accountable actor separate from the employees and other
agents who carry out its business. He concludes that corporate morality
at the organizational level must turn on the morality of organizational
characteristics-features of internal corporate power structures or ongoing values and means of operation that exist independent of the particular occupants of corporate positions. Individuals within the organization
are connected and constrained by "an organizational structure which defines roles for them, specifies the ways these roles relate to those of
others, and contains mechanisms for deliberating, making decisions, and
12. For example, the Lord Chancellor of England, in contemplating the difficulty of
legal control over corporations, lamented: "Did you ever expect a corporation to have a
conscience, when it has no soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked." According to
one account, he added in a stage whisper: "And by God, it ought to have both." See
Coffee, "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick". An UnscandalizedInquiry into the Problem of CorporatePunishment, 79 MicH. L. REv. 386, 386 & n.1 (1981). The Lord
Chancellor's concern over finding a corporate counterpart to these human features re-

flects his inability, shared by many lawyers even today, to view corporate actors in a
different organizational framework than individuals and to reinterpret legal standards to
achieve their underlying policy goals within that framework.
13. Professor Christopher Stone expressed a similar insight concerning legal analyses
when he observed:
Today's giant corporations ...are much more than persons who just happen to be
especially large and powerful. They are complex sociotechnical organisms-not
just men, or even men-and-machines-in-groups, but men, machines, patterns of
reward, ways of doing things, all divided up into loosely coordinated clusters of
cells. There is no reason to believe (as the law implicitly does) that the way "it"
will respond and adapt to external threats, the way "it" will scan the environment
for information, the way "it" will calculate and weigh "its" pleasures against "its"
pains is like that of an actual person.
Christopher Stone, Corporationsand the Law: Ending the Impass in CRIME AT THE
Top 329, 330-31 (J. Johnson & J. Douglas eds. 1978).

1991]

BOOK REVIEW

performing actions."" These structures encourage employees to under5
take certain patterns of decision and action and to avoid other patterns.2
These features of corporate organizations can restructure markedly the
conduct of those acting within the organization. The morality of this restructuring defines the moral quality of the organization.
Professor Elfstrom's identification of morally significant corporate features has both descriptive and normative implications. Its descriptive importance lies in redirecting the search for corporate misconduct-whether immoral or illegal-beyond just the occasional, aberrant
actions of a few corporate employees. Rather, Professor Elfstrom's analysis focuses the corporate morality inquiry on more serious forms of misconduct-those stemming from systemic corporate features with ongoing
effects on corporate decision making and corporate responsiveness to societal interests. These systemic features deserve attention since they can
affect many persons in a large organization and can be difficult to eradicate since they can survive the tenure of any particular position holder.
In a normative sense, Professor Elfstrom's focus emphasizes the need for
standards governing the morality of systemic corporate processes and values in any code of corporate ethics and morality. Corporate processes
and values can restructure individual employee behaviors towards or
away from socially risky behavior. At a minimum, morally significant
aspects of corporate operations include those features that may encourage
corporate employees to overlook their individual moral standards and to
undertake socially risky behavior they would otherwise avoid. No firm
that ignores these systemic sources of socially risky behavior in pursuit of
corporate goals can be deemed to be acting in a moral fashion, any more
than a person driving down the street with both eyes closed can be said

to be acting morally. Both are choosing to ignore risks that they have
created.
Completely articulated standards of corporate morality must identify
procedural and substantive measures of proper corporate conduct based
on principles like these. Unfortunately, Professor Elfstrom does not carry
forward his initial observations about systemic corporate features and
their moral implications to describe fully how corporate morality inquiries might be conducted. A number of difficult questions need to be answered to delineate the proper scope of these inquires. At what point
should actions taken by individuals within corporations be deemed corporate features meriting consideration in a corporate-level morality assessment? Does this turn on the scope of impact of an action or its dura-

14. ELFSTROM, supra note 2, at 14.
15. Id.
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tion or both? Do only certain types of corporate policies or practices
constitute morally relevant corporate features, such as information-gathering and management practices aimed at measuring and reducing societal injuries? Under what standards should the moral sufficiency of these
types of corporate features be measured? What evidence of sufficiency
would be relevant?
Professor Christopher Stone of the USC Law Center suggested one
approach to answering these questions some years ago. In his landmark
study, Where the Law Ends, 6 Professor Stone described a number of
organizational measures that large corporations can adopt to make their
firms responsive to legal constraints. These measures include: 1) making
resources available to corporate board members to enable ongoing analysis of corporate compliance with legal responsibilities; 2) board compositions structured to insure the representation of corporate stakeholders
and the public in board decision making; 3) management conduct codes
that promote responsiveness to legal demands; 4) information-handling
systems within large firms that can insure that key information on law
compliance and other socially significant aspects of corporate performance is gathered, and that this information rises to high levels within
corporate organizations; and 5) decision-making procedures that insure
that predicable law compliance problems and social impacts are addressed in corporate decision making."7
These same practices might be used more broadly to insure corporate
awareness of the social damage incident to its activities and to encourage
and monitor progress towards minimizing that damage. The adoption of

corporate features like these might then be taken as the mark of a morally responsible firm. Whether or not this approach is used, the characteristics of morally responsible corporate organizations need far more de-

tailed elaboration than Professor Elfstrom's brief treatment.
II.

THE CONTENT OF CORPORATE MORALITY

Professor Elfstrom argues that utilitarian theory is the "normative
perspective" that should ground moral claims on multinational corporations. He endorses normative analyses of multinational corporate conduct

under a variant of utilitarian theory articulated by Mr. R. M. Hare.' 8
According to this version of utilitarianism, conduct-corporate or otherwise-is desirable to the extent that it maximizes the fulfillment of the
16. C. STONE, supra note 8.
17. See id. at 122-227.
18. See RICHARD MERVYN HARE, MORAL THINKING: ITS LEVELS METHODS AND
POINT (1981).
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preferences people hold or that it is reasonable to believe they would
hold following reasoned deliberation. Professor Elfstrom concludes that
this approach has a number of advantages in characterizing the moral
quality of multinational corporate conduct. These advantages include the
ability to cut across varying cultures, values, and ideologies in different
parts Qf the world and the ability to provide a framework for moral
analysis even in the absence of sophisticated institutional systems defining virtuous corporate conduct or the rights of persons affected by
multinationals.
Following his adoption of utilitarianism as a normative framework,
Professor Elfstrom goes on to identify the types of individual preferences
that should be included in a utilitarian analysis of corporate morality,
separating these preferences into basic and secondary wants. In the first
category, Elfstrom includes preferences that he presumes all rational
persons desire: the preservation of life and the means to sustain it. He
interprets these to include preferences for a diet sufficient for normal

human activity, shelter, clothing, and basic medical care, as well as a
preference to avoid threats to human health and safety. In his category of
secondary wants, Elfstrom includes a broad range of preferences related
to personal fulfillment. For example, secondary wants include desires for
attractive clothes or rewarding careers. He distinguishes these secondary
wants from basic ones on the following grounds: 1) secondary concerns
are less important to preference holders since these concerns generally
will be ignored when their satisfaction will threaten physical well being;
2) secondary wants vary more considerably from person to person and
from place to place; and 3) secondary wants often are more costly and
difficult to fulfill than are the basic requirements of life.
After developing this dichotomy of personal preferences, Elfstrom uses
it to construct moral guidelines for multinational conduct. He concludes
that multinational corporations have clear moral obligations to avoid actions and policies that impinge on basic wants-to avoid behavior likely
to deprive people of their lives or health. He argues, however, that these
entities are subject to much weaker obligations to serve secondary wants.
These obligations are weak, according the Elfstrom, because secondary
wants "are morally less weighty and because of the practical difficulties
and unbounded costs . . . in the way of meeting them."' 9 He also be-

lieves that multinational firms should not be compelled by moral codes to
further the secondary wants of individuals since "the intrusion into
human and cultural life necessary to begin to meet them will be inappro-

19.

ELFSTROM,

supra note 2, at 34.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 24.1047

priate for corporations." 2
Professor Elfstrom's conclusion that corporate actors have moral obligations to avoid physical harm to individuals seems correct, but hardly
complete. His rejection of further corporate obligations for the secondary
wants of persons affected by corporate activities reflects an overly narrow
view of desirable corporate conduct. At least in connection with persons
directly affected by corporate operations-consumers, employees, contractors, lenders, or shareholders-a more complete corporate moral code
might include obligations concerning honesty, integrity, promise-keeping,
fidelity, fairness, caring and respect for others, public service, pursuit of
excellence, and accountability for corporate actions.21 Even if a corporate
moral code did not require specific results in these areas, it might still
obligate corporations to detect the preferences of affected parties concerning these aspects of corporate performance and to articulate and openly
pursue a program for reconciling competing preferences.
Taking just one of these types of obligations, the pursuit of excellence,
one can consider how a moral code broader than that proposed by Professor Elfstrom's might operate. Imagine a car company contemplating
the adoption of two car designs. The only difference between the two
designs is that Model A will last longer than Model B. The production
costs and safety characteristics of these two models are essentially identical. Assume further that the company adopts Model B, the less durable
design, because management believes that more frequent turnover in car
ownership will produce greater repeat sales.
Using Professor Elfstrom's analytic framework, this action results in
no moral implications for the corporation. The choice to build the less
durable design will not impinge on any basic want of car consumers.
This is because the two designs at stake are equally safe and the additional expense that car consumers will bear because they will purchase
cars more often probably will not be so large that it will threaten family
diets or raise other health concerns.
Although management's decision does not implicate basic wants, the
company's decision still would be morally suspect under a moral code
valuing the pursuit of product excellence. The decision to implement
Model B constitutes a knowing refusal to produce a better design-one
better serving the desire of car consumers to maximize value received for
car-purchase dollars. Furthermore, management has chosen a lesser
quality design with obvious negative implications to consumers to gain a

20.

Id.

21. See Josephson, Teaching Ethical Decision Making and Principled Reasoning,
EThics, Winter, 1988, at 27, 29-30.
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remote and highly speculative benefit for the corporation and its shareholders. This decision should be condemned as immoral simply because
it elevates a small or non-existent corporate gain over easily attained
product quality improvements and increased consumer satisfaction.
Despite his rejection of a moral obligation on the part of large concerns to pursue the secondary wants of individuals, portions of Professor
Elfstrom's discussion imply support for just this obligation. For example,
Elfstrom cites with approval Milton Freedman's observation that corporate organizations are subject to obligations of honesty and fairness in
dealing with others. In instances when a direct link between corporate
dishonesty and public safety is not present, however, a corporation's dishonesty matters because it restricts the fulfillment of the secondary wants
of affected parties. For example, a corporation that adopted a policy of

consistently misportraying the useful life of cars it was selling would be
acting dishonestly toward consumers, but would only be impairing those
consumers' ability to satisfy a secondary want-namely, the desire to
achieve maximum return from car-purchase dollars by informed consumer choices. While Elfstrom would seem to agree that this corporate
conduct is immoral, this result is inconsistent with his general rule that
corporate morality demands only that corporations avoid actions impinging on basic harms to human life or safety.
A value scheme like Professor Elfstrom's will shield most corporate
business practices from moral accountability even though those practices
do not address the full range of personal interests known by corporate
personnel to be affected by the practices. This weak moral framework
invites toleration of arbitrary, but not life-threatening, conduct by firms
that can result in shoddy products and avoidable harms to employees,
shareholders, and societal interests. Honesty in corporate operations,
while essential to corporate morality, is not enough. Honest greed-the
honest pursuit of profit maximization at the expense of all other values
except public safety-is an inadequate measure of corporate morality
unless society will treat the corporate equivalents of Dickens' Mr.
Scrooge as moral giants. Large corporations are capable of better behavior, and applicable moral standards should demand it.
III.

INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF CORPORATE MORALITY

Professor Elfstrom goes on to assess moral accountably problems that
arise when large corporations engage in multinational operations. He
gives separate attention to problems emanating from: 1) the sheer size of
many multinationals, and their ability to exercise enormous economic

power in small, undeveloped nations; 2) the difficulty of imposing company-wide moral standards in the face of diverse, and sometimes conflict-
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ing, cultural values in different states; 3) the ability of many multinationals to move products, employees, and other operations among states
either to obscure which nation has jurisdiction over dangerous conduct or
to obtain the most favorable environment for that conduct; and 4) the
tendency of some multinationals to align with strong governments in
overseas settings-either because the governments are major customers
or because alignment creates advantages for the multinationals in general
business operations within the states-allowing the corporations to be
manipulated by government officials to serve political purposes.
Although all these discussions contain valuable insights, Professor Elfstrom's examination of intercultural conflicts is particularly interesting.
Elfstrom considers a number of settings in which cultural conflicts presently affect multinational operations, including varying cultural acceptance of racial or sexual discrimination and payments, gifts, or bribes in
the course of commercial transactions. He argues that corporate responses to varying value schemes in different states should be governed

by two basic principles: first, a corporation should have a single set of
publicly announced standards to govern its operations worldwide; and
second, these standards should be included in agreements or accords
shaping commercial and other relationships in individual foreign states.
Elfstrom goes on to examine how these broad principles might be
translated into specific corporate conduct in the face of three types of
value conflicts. The first occurs when the standards of moral conduct
that a corporation wishes to uphold, though consistent with official policy
in a particular nation, conflict with common, informal practices in that
state. For example, corporate attempts to maintain complete gender
equality in operations in Japan might conflict with the unofficial, but
nonetheless real, cultural aversion of business partners to deal with female business executives on an equal footing. In these settings, Elfstrom
suggests that the proper course for a multinational corporation is to announce publicly the standards of equality it intends to use in dealing
with people inside and outside the corporation and to press for compliance with those policies when possible, but to accept the hypocrisy of
discrimination when no alternative exists.
In Elfstrom's view, breaches of corporate equal opportunity standards
to accommodate local customs usually are not immoral. He feels that
employees will seldom be deprived of subsistence resources because of

these breaches-perhaps because he assumes that they can fulfill their
basic needs through other jobs in the same state or through similar jobs
elsewhere in the world. In terms of Elfstrom's general analytic frame-

work, corporate compliance with cultural hypocrisy concerning employment opportunities does not rise to the level of corporate immorality

19911

BOOK REVIEW

since its primary impact is in lessening the job opportunities and fulfillment of affected employees, a disappointment only of the secondary
wants of these employees. Elfstrom does not state when, if ever, the steps
necessary to do business in such a hypocritical culture will be so onerous
that a corporation is morally obligated to forego continued business operations there.
A second, even less avoidable form of conflict arises when values conflicting with corporate standards are embedded firmly in a particular
culture, as in states in which legal or religious standards compel observance of certain values. Corporate actions adhering to contrary standards

may be deeply offensive to local citizens or even illegal. An example of
this conflict would be corporate policies requiring equal treatment of
male and female employees in Saudi Arabia. These policies would conflict with widely-observed and strongly-enforced religious standards limiting the activities of women.
Here, Elfstrom suggests that the full extent of corporate moral obligation is to seek interstices in the local cultural requirements and to attempt to maintain corporate values within these narrow gaps. For example, he suggests that a corporation might seek to apply its usual policies
to employees brought into a restrictive state, while treating native employees in accordance with local, more restrictive standards. Again, Elfstrom does not explain fully why this mode of operation is morally superior to simply ceasing operations in a state where corporate values
cannot be observed. Presumably, however, it is a reflection of his earlier
conclusion that negative treatment of employees under local standards
rarely will be so serious as to deprive them of their basic livelihood and
that other consequences are morally insignificant for the corporation.
Finally, Elfstrom considers value conflicts that involve both basic
needs and little hope of cultural change. He cites restraints on corporate
equal employment opportunity practices in South Africa as an example
of such an extraordinary value conflict. Elfstrom believes this conflict is
especially serious because racial discrimination in South Africa directly
affects human survival and physical well being, this discrimination is
compelled and perpetuated by the state, and there is little indication of

substantial movement towards reform. He concludes that adherence to
South African laws places corporations in an immoral position, not offset
by any meaningful opportunity to promote improvements that would reduce this immorality in the future. Consequently, Elfstrom believes that
the only moral course is for corporations rejecting racial discrimination
to sever all ties with South Africa. Beyond explaining this conclusion,
Elfstrom identifies the features such as intractability and official support
that, in his view, make the South African situation morally untenable for

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 24:1047

multinationals, thereby suggesting the types of value conflicts that may
make similar corporate departures morally warranted in the future.
IV.

FEATURES OF A MATURE MORAL ORDER

Professor Elfstrom concludes with observations regarding the steps
necessary to achieve a mature moral order governing multinational corporations-a system in which members
have a distinct sense of accepted standards of conduct; are aware of how
responsibility and accountability are assigned to participants; understand
that there are effective sanctions for use against those who fail to uphold
recognized standards; acknowledge that there are means of recognizing
those whose conduct is exemplary; and, most importantly, collectively recognize that they are part of a moral enterprise.22
Elfstrom sees numerous barriers to the achievement of this moral order. In the short run, he feels that this moral order will require the
development of moral codes for application to worldwide corporate operations, government actions to make some or all of these codes genuinely
authoritative for corporate actors, and the development of an international equivalent of "case law" to collect and preserve illustrations of
how generally framed moral standards apply to particular instances of
multinational conduct.
Eventually, Professor Elfstrom argues that the moral order governing
multinational corporations should be embodied in formal codes with
means of coercion or punishment to insure corporate compliance. As a
corollary to the creation of these codes, he feels that two types of bureaucratic structures will be necessary to insure corporate compliance: first, a
system "dedicated to communicating accepted standards to employees
and encouraging them to speak out when they encounter moral difficulty," 23 and second, entities outside of national governments and multinational corporations charged with setting and enforcing standards for
both national laws and corporate conduct. 24 He identifies the United Nations and independent international organizations like the International
Labor Organization as possible holders of this standard-setting
authority.
While these actions would promote corporate adherence to the moral
codes involved, there are several reasons to believe that these ambitious,
and perhaps unattainable, developments may be both insufficient and

22.

ELFSTROM,

23. Id. at 107.
24. Id. at 108.

supra note 2, at 7-8 (emphasis in original).
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unnecessary to realize Professor Elfstrom's vision of a mature moral order governing multinational corporations. Formal moral accountability
structures of the sort proposed by Professor Elfstrom will be ineffective
to constrain multinational conduct if government officials and the public
have no more information about internal corporate affairs than is disclosed currently. Even if extensive, formally codified standards exist, they
will have little practical significance if violations of them will go undetected because they can be concealed from public view. The secrecy typically maintained by large corporations, coupled with the particularly
weak law enforcement resources of governments in many underdeveloped
states, will tend to insure that misconduct rarely comes to light. If external moral accountability is to be a major force in redirecting multinational corporate conduct, regular assessments and public reporting on
morally significant corporate conduct must accompany the creation of
moral codes. Without mandatory information gathering features, the
sorts of moral accountability structures suggested by Professor Elfstrom
would be empty gestures.
Were greater information available to the public about multinational
corporate conduct, however, it is unclear that the sorts of formal structures identified by Professor Elfstrom will be necessary to achieve his
goals. He understates the importance of private action outside of governmental and institutional frameworks as a potential constraint on multinational corporations. Indeed, in the case of his primary example of a
desirable corporate response to moral pressure-the departure of most
United States multinationals from South Africa-it was primarily private shareholder action and further public criticism that created pressures for firms to leave, not the far more permissive foreign policy of the
federal government or any other government body.
Private action .can exert moral pressures on multinational firms
through a number of channels. First, unofficial commentators-such as
Professor Elfstrom himself-contribute to the formulation of moral standards simply by articulating persuasive rationals for distinguishing between moral and immoral corporate conduct. Second, observers of corporate conduct can influence the public reputation of multinational
corporations by reporting on whether corporate conduct meets privately
identified moral conduct standards. Finally, those with direct influence
on corporate conduct, like shareholders, employees, and consumers, can
reshape their conduct to support firms that have reputations as responsible moral actors and to withhold support from those firms that do not.
For the immediate future, these private mechanisms provide more promise for progress toward the moral accountability of multinationals than
the more elaborate mechanisms that Professor Elfstrom envisions. Of
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course, the effectiveness of any moral accountability system based on pri-

vate comment and evaluation of the moral character of corporate conduct
will turn on the public availability of sufficient information to make
these judgments.
V.

CONCLUSION

Professor Elfstrom's study provides a valuable starting point for further debate on the moral accountability of multinational concerns. Although he has not answered all of the provocative questions that his
analysis raises, Professor Elfstrom has covered many of the key issues in
this field with great insight.
Unfortunately, the corporate moral standards advocated by Professor
Elfstrom demand too little. His view of corporate morality largely overlooks impacts of corporate activity beyond individual health and safety,
thereby precluding moral criticism of firms for pursuit of profit maximization at the expense of other values like product quality or employee
civil rights. A moral code equal to the task of shaping multinational corporate conduct should be as broadly inclusive as the international activities and corresponding social impacts that it seeks to influence. Professor
Elfstrom's narrow moral scheme seems adequate only to condemn the
worst corporate offenders, not to guide multinational firms towards new
levels of corporate responsibility.

